How have relations between Israel and Turkey changed after the coup attempt

Фото: Depositphotos

The events of last month in the Middle East give an idea of ​​the main opportunities and threats in the region today. The recent rapprochement between Israel and Turkey, as well as the considerable territorial losses of ISIL militants over the past few months, give rise to a slight optimism that moderate forces will ultimately prevail over the region’s radicals.

On the other hand, we have just witnessed a failed coup in Turkey, which immediately put in jeopardy the continuation of airstrikes of the coalition of the Incirlik airbase against ISIS. It takes months, if not years, to determine the implications for both Turkey and the region.

Also a year has passed since the conclusion of a nuclear treaty on Iran - it's time to weigh the positive and negative consequences that have occurred since last summer. The fact that Iran continues to provide financial and military support to its killer clients, such as Bashar al-Assad or Hezbollah, may not violate this imperfect Treaty, but the violence and increasing instability sown by Tehran are beyond doubt.

Add to this the terrorist attacks on several continents supported and sponsored by ISIS, and there is little doubt that radical Islamism continues to be a tangible threat to peace and security - both in the region and on the planet as a whole.

Relations between Israel and Turkey: Long-Awaited Rapprochement Becoming a Reality

The rapprochement between Israel and Turkey, proclaimed last month, is a direct result of the changing geopolitical situation in the Middle East. Since the crisis broke out between the two countries six years ago, when the IDF killed nine Turkish citizens during a raid against the flotilla in an attempt to break through the Turkish blockade of Gaza, significant changes helped align the interests of Israel and Turkey on several fronts.

First of all, the improvement of relations between Turkey and Israel reflects a new reality, which President Recep Tayyip Erdogan had to reluctantly accept. His dreams of a new era of Ottoman rule came to an end; Turkey’s zero-issue policy regarding its neighbors has been shaken. Erdogan’s early support of the Assad rule in Syria, as well as his sympathies for the organization of the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt, could not expand his sphere of influence. Even the countries of the Persian Gulf are curtailing trade relations with the unstable Turkish president.

As the foreign policy of Turkey turned into a “zero friends”, the only solution for Erdogan was to resume relations with Israel, Russia and others. Although Israel’s willingness to deal with Turkey is in Israel’s economic and diplomatic interests, it does so with wide-open eyes. This is especially relevant against the background of the consequences of a military attempt to rein in presidential intentions to concentrate power in their hands at the expense of other institutions.

The disintegration of Syria has significantly affected the national security of both countries, since radical jihadist forces are significantly present along the Syrian border. Of course, Erdogan plays a double game as an unreliable ally of NATO, who reluctantly fights ISIS, given that the Kurdish forces - which he considers the main enemy of Turkey - are fighting the so-called Caliphate more effectively than anyone else. Erdogan’s indecision is exacerbated by the fact that every time he decides to strike at ISIL, the terrorists strike a stronger blow in return.

The Israeli-Turkish agreement includes a formal apology and a proposal for compensation from Jerusalem to the families of the Turkish victims, but does not satisfy Turkey’s demands to lift the blockade on Gaza. Ankara, in turn, rejected Israel’s demand to close Hamas’s Turkish headquarters and cease the activities of Islamist organizations on its territory.

In short, a set of geopolitical and economic considerations, in the end, led the two sides to convergence. Ankara did the same with Moscow after a period of tense relations caused by the downed Russian military aircraft eight months ago. These considerations show Turkey’s need to put an end to both its regional isolation and its confusing policy, which has become even less transparent today than it was before the failed coup attempt.

Israel, for its part, views Turkey as a potential market for its Mediterranean natural gas fields. For Netanyahu there are important political benefits, since he can demonstrate to both the Israelis and the international community his moderate, peaceful international policy, thereby improving Israel’s position in the region.

It goes without saying that the agreement between Ankara and Jerusalem will not return the long days of the Turkish-Israeli strategic alliance that existed in the 1990's. However, the deal can strengthen states such as Israel, Egypt, Turkey, Jordan, and Saudi Arabia to promote economic ties and security cooperation while they oppose radical groups that can destabilize the Middle East by trying to establish a new order region.

A year after the conclusion of the Iranian nuclear agreement: the risk of nuclear safety declined in the short term, but Iran’s aggressiveness and regional ambitions, as expected, increased

14 July has passed a year since the signing of the Iranian nuclear deal, the most significant foreign policy initiative of President Obama and, by and large, the most controversial.

Until today, Iran has diligently tried to fulfill its obligations under the agreement. He significantly reduced the total number of centrifuges and sent most of his reserves of nuclear fuel abroad. He also suspended the operation of a nuclear reactor that could produce plutonium for nuclear weapons, and opened its nuclear facilities and network of nuclear enterprises for a more thorough inspection of the IAEA.

However, the administration’s confidence in the future success of this agreement may be too optimistic. For a start, Tehran demonstrates growing signs of discontent over not receiving the full economic benefits expected from the deal, and blames Washington for not implementing the agreement, despite the fact that its current economic problems are mainly due to the inability of Iranian banks to meet international standards. .

Secondly, according to recent German intelligence reports, Iran has repeatedly tried to obtain secret nuclear weapons technologies (as well as chemical and biological weapons technologies) from Germany.

Third, Tehran continues to violate UN Security Council resolutions by testing ballistic missiles, passing conventional weapons and violating international entry bans. And although such violations of the resolutions of the UN Security Council are not direct violations of the nuclear agreement, they clearly do not correspond to his spirit.

Iran has yet to face the consequences of its behavior. Moreover, the administration seems to have worked hard to appease Tehran, making efforts and persuading foreign companies to cooperate with Iran. Such an approach may lead to the fact that supporters of a tough policy in Iran will believe that they will get away with a gradual undermining of the nuclear agreement. One of the challenges of the next US administration would be to deter Iranians from such actions.

Iran’s aggressive approach is also evident in its regional policy, which, in turn, reinforced the fears of the Gulf countries regarding Tehran’s hegemonic intentions. In Bahrain, a tiny Sunni monarchy in the Persian Gulf with the majority of the Shiite population, amid a nuclear agreement, fears are growing that Iran will increase its efforts to overthrow the Sunni regime in the country to replace it with Shiite leaders. Considering Ayatollah’s claims that Bahrain is rightfully an Iranian province that needs to be returned, the influence of clerics is clearly visible in this commotion.

Manama’s heightened fears forced the Bahrain regime to take unprecedented measures against its Shiite population, which culminated in the recent decision to revoke the country's highest Shiite clergyman’s citizenship. Tehran - which is supposed to be the patron saint of all Shiites in the world - responded no less unprecedentedly. Qasem Suleimani, commander of the elite special forces al-Quds as part of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps, publicly warned that actions against Shiite clerics would “cross the red line and provoke a [such] reaction ... that Al Khalifa [the ruling Sunni Bahrain family] would disappear ".

It is possible that Bahrain is approaching the moment of truth in the struggle between the Sunnis and Shiites, whose regional implications should not be underestimated. If each side does not begin to demonstrate extreme restraint, these events can be the trigger of direct confrontation between the giants of the region - Sunni Saudi Arabia and Shiite Iran, which, in turn, can further inflame the region.

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