Foreign Policy: Kremlin attracts Georgia

Russian forces are consolidating their gains in Ukraine, despite the timid protests of Western leaders, and the ghost of Russian revanchism continues to unnerve much of Eastern Europe. But thundering tanks and legions of separatists are not the only cause of concern. And Ukraine is not the only goal of Russia.

Perhaps the most disturbing warning signals come from Georgia, which is a faithful Euro-Atlantic partner with powerful pro-Western political sentiments. It has long been the hallmark of Western foreign policy. Being a longtime opponent of Russian military adventures, Georgia tried to get out of the regional influence of Russia and sought membership in Euro-Atlantic structures. She gained a reputation as a reliable and enthusiastic partner of the West. However, Western passivity in the face of Russian aggression and territorial seizures is beginning to have an impact. After many years of dissatisfaction with which the Georgians watched Russian protégés seized 20% of their territory, having expelled about 300 of thousands of Georgian citizens from there, certain forces start asking questions about whether these losses are worth keeping the close ties with the West. And more and more often Georgians have an idea that they are not worth it.

Those organizations and groups that lead actions to strengthen Russian influence in Georgia are invisible to Western radars, since they operate at the level of local media in Georgian and often repeat hackneyed phrases about their pro-Western sentiments. But they also organize protest demonstrations in Tbilisi streets, preaching in Georgian churches and holding very well-funded election rallies and campaigns. There are plenty of signs that Russian influence in Georgia is increasing.

But at the Washington round tables and in private conversations, Western officials and experts downplayed the possibilities of Russian export propaganda and its gain in Georgia. The reason for this complacency is rooted in the results of regular polls conducted by the International Republican Institute and the National Democratic Institute, which demonstrate continued public support for Euro-Atlantic integration at the level of 60-70% of respondents. One by one, the Georgian governments endorse their pro-Western foreign policy with such approval ratings.

So support for Euro-Atlantic integration is extensive. But is it deep? Those familiar with ordinary Georgians say that reality is much more complicated, as is often the case.

In one of the scenes of the popular Georgian TV series “The Best Friends of My Wife”, guests at the wedding ceremony hear an announcement that Georgia has just received a coveted MAP (membership action plan), which is the prelude to NATO membership. The shocked crowd stops in silence, and then begins to applaud and exult. One of the heroes, clapping and cheering with everyone, turns to the other guest and asks: “What is MAP?”.

This scene vividly demonstrates the enormous social and even civilizational appeal of NATO among Georgians, and at the same time, it reveals a harsher truth: pro-Western loyalties in Georgian society are largely emotional, and not based on deep knowledge. Take a closer look at the polling data and you will see that the picture is much more alarming.

Integration with the West is at best a third-rate issue for Georgians, according to an August poll by the National Democratic Institute. Respondents are more concerned about everyday problems such as employment (63% of respondents) and poverty (32%), which overshadow all other topics. Accession to NATO and the EU ranks a distant 10th and 17th, respectively. Of the 21 questions asked, Georgians named NATO and EU membership as the main topics that the authorities spend too much time discussing.

But the greatest concern is caused by the signs of aspiration to the Eurasian Economic Union, which is the Moscow alternative to the EU, hidden in the depth of sociological research. The number of supporters of joining the EEU is steadily growing from 11% at the end of 2013 to 16% in the middle of 2014. Who are these Georgians who are ready to surrender the sovereignty of their country to the very power that clings to Georgian territories with an iron grip and tears pieces away from other neighboring states with impunity?

Part of the answer can be found in the emerging segment of pro-Russian non-governmental organizations, bearing innocuous names like “Eurasian Institute”, “Eurasian Choice” and “Our Home Earth”. Many of these organizations come and go as needed. Today it is called the “Georgian Peace Committee”, tomorrow it will be called something else, but in general they are often associated with the same group of pro-Russian ideologists and political entrepreneurs who often make pilgrimages to Moscow and probably receive funding from the Kremlin, as they say representatives of the Georgian ruling party and opposition. The overall message of their message is not an apology for Soviet nostalgia, but rather “Eurasianism” and “Orthodox civilization,” which in Kremlin newspeak means Putinism. Statements about the conservatism of Georgian society, economic vulnerability and dissatisfaction with the abuses of the previous authorities are helping to win over new supporters from among the Georgian population, which is increasingly irritated by Georgia's unrewarded and protracted love affair with the West.

In the middle of 2014, Eurasian organizations became heroes of headlines in the media because of their harsh opposition to the anti-discrimination bill, which was discussed in the Georgian parliament. His opponents focused on those provisions that prohibited discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation. They argued that these provisions are equivalent to promoting a homosexual lifestyle. But these people came to protest not alone - pro-Russian activists were accompanied by priests from the Georgian Orthodox Church in their characteristic robes.

The church was also shocked by the provisions of the anti-discrimination law and demanded that language protecting sexual minorities be removed. The Georgian Orthodox Church is one of the oldest Christian churches in the entire world and is a stronghold of Georgian nationalism. Polls consistently show that the church is the most trusted church in the country. But her common interests with the Eurasians do not boil down to tactical alliances in anti-homosexual rhetoric. Although she herself nominally favors Georgia's EU membership, some powerful factions in the church hierarchy openly fuel religious nationalism and admire Russia.

Today, church representatives are increasingly at the forefront of reactionary activities. In mid-2013, the clergy found themselves at the forefront of horrific anti-gay pogroms in central Tbilisi. Church authorities justify protests against and attacks on Georgian Muslims. Church leaders say the West is “worse than Russia” and sometimes even describe the 2008 Russian invasion as divine intervention against integration with the West. These statements are echoed by Georgian Eurasian non-governmental organizations.

The growing visibility of pro-Russian organizations and the strengthening of anti-Western positions in the ranks of the church merge with the third component of the pro-Russian triad, which is the revival of anti-Western political parties. After the change of power in 2012, pro-Russian politicians emerged from the darkest corners of Georgian political life and today they are turning into a more effective political force.

The pro-Russian political agitator Nino Burdzhanadze, formerly a supporter of pro-Western integration, today formed a political coalition that is frankly aimed at separating Georgia from the Euro-Atlantic linkage. In the presidential and local elections in 2013 and 2014, the armed Eurasian rhetoric, which received a large and apparently Russian money, Burjanadze, managed to get about 10% of votes. And the rapidly growing union “Alliance of Patriots”, which is a populist party with anti-Western inclinations, in June 2014 of the year gained almost 5% of votes. Recently, the “patriots” held a large rally in Tbilisi. If these numbers are maintained, the parliamentary elections of the 2016 year may lead to a completely different orientation of the government. The 15-percentage result will be enough for a powerful faction of pro-Russian deputies to appear in parliament. This will destroy inter-party unity in foreign policy issues and affect the negotiations on the creation of a coalition.

Former Georgian Defense Minister Irakli Alasania today thinks about Russia. “There are very active pro-Russian groups, and there are thousands of protesters who oppose Western integration,” he recently told me about the rally of the Alliance of Patriots. He expressed concern that the current government is downplaying the growing Russian threat. Now that Alasania’s “Free Democrats” party is in the parliamentary opposition, the ranks of confidently pro-Western parties in the coalition led by the Georgian Dream have noticeably thinned out, and the influence of conservative and protectionist factions within the coalition has increased.

But perhaps this is just the beginning. If these trends continue, the foreign policy consensus in Georgia, which in the West has long been taken for granted, can begin to fall apart seriously. To the credit of “Georgian Dream”, it manages to find a balance between geopolitical pragmatism and Euro-Atlantic enthusiasm, however, it is increasingly losing popularity among the voters who pinned great hopes on it. If everything is as it is now, then in 2016, the parliament will be very different from its current composition. An oppositional United National Movement could lose half of its 51 mandate, or even more. In its place, a gathering of openly anti-Western deputies from the coalition of Burjanadze and from the Alliance of Patriots may appear. If the “Georgian Dream” does not fall apart, it may well remain the largest parliamentary bloc. However, the arrival of large anti-Western groups in parliament may force it to weaken or even completely abandon pro-Western policies for reasons of political necessity.

Such a trajectory of movement should cause deep concern. Even if Georgia tries to divide its orientation between the West and Moscow, it can quickly drown in the shifting sands of Russian influence, as it has become with other guides of such a strategy - Azerbaijan, Armenia and Kazakhstan. Such a result will lead to the strengthening of the Russian geostrategic superiority in the Caucasus, and with it, to Russia's complete monopoly on trans-Eurasian energy and trade flows.

The West could throw a much-needed lifeline to Georgia's liberals. While the association agreement with the EU signed last June is certainly a positive sign, and a deep and comprehensive free trade area has huge potential for the future, the main prize for most ordinary Georgians will be the prospect of visa-free travel to the EU. If such a measure is adopted this year, as there is great hope, it will seriously increase the authority of the West and its credibility. And even though Georgia’s direct membership in NATO is not being considered, other visible gestures, say, giving the country the status of a leading US ally outside NATO, would be a painless step forward and essentially consolidate the already existing state of affairs. It would also recognize Georgia's deep commitment to the Euro-Atlantic space and the disproportionate contribution it makes to it.

Today it is clear that the time when the pro-Western consensus of Georgia was taken for granted quickly comes to an end. Russian influence on its periphery is growing from Eastern Europe to the Caucasus and Central Asia, while Georgia remains the coveted prize. Yes, there were military interventions, information wars, operations to influence - but Moscow today opened a new page in its attempt to regain Georgia, acting by hook or by crook.