The New York Times: What the West Misunderstands in Russia

When George Kennan wrote his famous Long Telegram, he mentioned Joseph Stalin only three times. Seventy years later, Vladimir Putin's name adorns almost every page of the scores of memos and documents that attempt to understand the worldview behind Russia's strategic behavior, writes in The New York Times Ivan Krastev, Chairman of Center for Liberal Strategies (Sofia). The authors reason this way: to understand Putin means to understand Russia. But is this completely correct?

During the heady days of the Cold War, Americans viewed Soviet decision-making as a “black box.” “Soviet policy was considered both mysterious and strategic,” Krastev notes.

According to political scientist Gleb Pavlovsky, the Kremlin today remains mysterious, but there is no strategy. “According to Pavlovsky, the Kremlin’s policy is created rather like the music of a jazz band: its constant improvisations are attempts to survive the next crisis,” the article says.

Contrary to established stereotypes, in his book The System of the Russian Federation, Pavlovsky insists that after Putin took personal responsibility for the annexation of Crimea and won the support of more than 80% of the population, he lost interest in day-to-day decision-making. “He wants to be informed about everything, but does not want to play the role of a national manager,” Krastev reports.

“As a result, wars among various factions in power have intensified,” he outlines Pavlovsky’s ideas.

Russia, from the point of view of Pavlovsky, is driven not by the desire to spread its power outside, but by internal weakness - the lack of prospects for its future existence without Putin.

Putin may be the real tsar, but Russia is not a monarchy. His daughters will not replace him in the Kremlin, Pavlovsky notes. Putin is a popularly elected president, but his political system has destroyed the legitimacy of elections as an instrument for the peaceful transition of power. His United Russia party is useful only for winning staged elections, but, unlike the Chinese Communist Party, it lacks the independence and ideological coherence to ensure continuity of power.

“In the absence of prospects, conspiracy theories and apocalyptic forecasts tempt the Russian elite,” Pavlovsky believes. As writer Alexander Prokhanov laments, the elite knows that “perestroika-2” will not work for them. It is better, as he says, to provoke a new world war than to try to curtail Putin's plans.

“Reading Pavlovsky’s book, one can understand that in Western analytics devoted to today’s Russia, this “apocalyptic worldview” of Putin’s political and intellectual elite is completely absent,” the article says. “For Pavlovsky, the experience of the catastrophic collapse of the Soviet Union, more than geopolitical interests or values, is the key to understanding Russian strategic behavior and the internal logic of the Putin regime.”