Why Serdyukov was acquitted

Serdyukov's service career for 15 years was associated with the furniture trade. On February 15, 2007, President Putin appointed Senior Lieutenant Serdyukov as Defense Minister. He fired him from this position on November 6, 2012.
And after a while, the former Russian defense minister was accused of negligence and abuse of power, which entailed large embezzlements. Multi-billion dollar damage has been proven. Nevertheless, on February 21 of this year, when Anatoly Serdyukov filed a petition for amnesty, it was granted almost immediately.
Indeed, for almost 7 years, Serdyukov quite successfully coped with the tasks for which he was appointed. And in comparison with these tasks, even the most outrageous robbery is a child's prank. He carried out a full-scale military-administrative reform of the Russian armed forces, restructuring their organization and structure of command and control bodies and significantly reducing the activities of the military industry.
The main reform carried out was the reorganization of the ground forces (Land Forces). In the course of it, squadron formations were eliminated, which, in the event of war, required a mobilization deployment.
As a result of the reform, 85 brigades of constant readiness remained in the army - about 300 thousand people. Including 34 motorized rifle, 5 tank, 21 missile and artillery troops, 4 airborne assault troops. Equipment - about 5 thousand tanks and more than 18 thousand armored vehicles. Each brigade is deployed to wartime states and is ready to immediately carry out a combat mission.
The total number of units and subunits decreased from 1890 to 172. Of the entire mobilization component, only 60 weapons storage bases remained, and the whole of it decreased 25 times: from 20 million to 800 thousand people. A new staff structure "battalion - brigade - operational command" was introduced and the traditional army regiments, divisions, corps, army and military districts were eliminated.
According to the same principle, the air force and air defense were reorganized: armies, corps, divisions and air regiments were abolished, a system of air bases and aerospace defense brigades was introduced instead. About 1500 combat aircraft are now in full readiness for combat operations, including 150 long-range, 500 front-line bombers and about 700 fighters.
The reorganization of the ground army and aviation has not bypassed other types of Russian armed forces. Only 3 airborne divisions have remained relatively intact.
What caused the need for such radical reforms of the Russian armed forces? The main reason: the new military-strategic doctrine of the Kremlin. In general terms, according to SIPRI (Stockholm Institute for Peace Problems), it is formulated as follows: “… The previous algorithms for transferring the armed forces to the military track no longer meet the conditions of war. Today, given the transient nature of modern warfare, it is unlikely that it will be realistic to deploy military units, mothballed for mobilization plans. Because the modern war lasts quickly, the active phase lasts two to three weeks. Therefore, objectively, the Russian armed forces will fight in the event of a possible war with the composition of weapons that are in the army and navy today and must fully comply with these requirements. "
In other words, the military-strategic doctrine orients the Russian armed forces not towards the defense of the Fatherland, but towards a short-lived offensive campaign. Blitzkrieg in German. It is for the blitzkrieg that the fully combat-ready ground, airborne troops and combat aviation of Russia are suitable.
Why, however, the former furniture dealer Serdyukov was chosen for a radical reorganization of the Russian army? First of all, because Vladimir Putin knew him well from Leningrad. And in 2004 he was appointed head of the Federal Tax Service of Russia. In this post, Serdyukov showed himself to be a tough and absolutely uncompromising leader, fulfilling exactly the most seemingly outrageous plans of the president.
And such were, in essence, the military reforms carried out by him. Because for their implementation, Serdyukov in the first three years fired 150 thousand officers - 60 percent of the total number. He liquidated the institution of warrant officers and warrant officers, carried out other measures, reducing the Russian armed forces to one million soldiers and officers. However, they did not become fully professional, as in the United States: about 300 thousand soldiers serve only one year.
But in addition, central government bodies were reorganized and reduced. The military-administrative division of Russia was changed: instead of six districts, four new ones were created. The system of military education has been rebuilt and reduced, etc.
As you understand, Serdyukov himself had nothing to do with the development of these reforms. Their main directions were given by the Kremlin and planned by the General Staff. The minister, on the other hand, controlled the execution and did it super harshly and categorically. And besides, he did not hesitate in expressions, swore, regardless of faces and stripes, smashed chiefs of all levels with subordinates, far from always understanding the essence of their actions. For rudeness and covetousness and because of the scandal around fraud with state property, he received the nicknames TT and Toshka Taburetkin.
When analyzing the results of the Georgian campaign, Serdyukov used his last words to annoy the leadership of the General Staff and the command of the Southern Military District, although he himself had nothing to do with its planning and implementation. Meanwhile, in this campaign for the first time in practice brigades of all branches of the military operated, and in general they were quite successful. They quickly and unexpectedly concentrated on the Ossetian and Abkhazian directions and in a short time defeated the main forces of the Georgians.
The campaign appears to have affirmed Putin in the advantages of fully operational formations for the realization of his aggressive intentions. The annexation of Crimea became real also thanks to such actions. By the way, the notorious "little green men" in Crimea are officers and sergeants of the airborne assault brigades concentrated behind Perekop.
On the peninsula, one should dwell especially. Because it is the most important link in the Kremlin's strategic doctrine, and its occupation was inevitable. According to the naval component of the doctrine, the Baltic and Black Seas should become the main base of the naval surface forces of the Russian Navy. Crimea is the key to the Black Sea.
However, the Russian navy is currently equipped with a naval personnel unsuitable for the far-reaching tasks of the doctrine. A significant part of the naval ships are not capable of combat and are listed in service only nominally, and long-distance cruises of individual large warships cannot do without escorting rescue tugs. Only one aircraft-carrying cruiser, four cruisers, six destroyers, and ten large anti-submarine ships are relatively combat-ready: a total of about 20 surface ships of the 1st and 2nd ranks. All of them are still of Soviet construction. Since 2008, the Navy has only been replenished with a frigate and three corvettes. And not a single ship of the first class. Because there is nowhere to build them, they are bought abroad. In particular, in December 2010, France won a tender for the supply of the Russian Navy with four Mistral-class amphibious assault dock ships. The cost of each is more than 500 million euros.
But the USSR was building big ships. In Nikolaev, cruisers were made, and all Soviet aircraft carriers. Now it is quiet in Nikolaev. The factories are standing still. Their owners change once a year. The staff of each enterprise was reduced by 20 times. The glorious past is reminded only by the building berth of the Black Sea shipyard, where the aircraft carriers were built, and the unfinished flagship of the Ukrainian fleet, the cruiser Ukraina, which has been at the berth of the 20 Communards Shipyard for 61 years.
This city is the most desirable target for Russia if its expansion in Ukraine continues. In principle, such an operation is already possible. For its implementation, two groups are concentrated - in the Crimea and Transnistria. By advancing along converging directions, they in a short time can seize the Ukrainian Black Sea coast and Kherson, Nikolaev and Odessa. And Russia will start building aircraft carriers.
In contrast to the naval component of the Russian Navy, their submarine forces are being built up quite successfully. The naval component of the strategic triad contains 10 missile-carrying submarines, including the two newest Borey projects. By 2018, 4 more are to be added to them. Together with those in service, they will form two squadrons of missile-carrying submarines deployed in the Northern and Pacific fleets, where they have free access to the world ocean. In terms of numbers, they will be comparable to similar US forces, which are equipped with Ohio-class submarines.
It is necessary to add that the Borei are equipped with new solid-propellant missiles of the Bulava type, capable of carrying 10 individually targeted thermonuclear warheads.
By the way, the transition to solid-fuel carriers is also being carried out in the ground component of the Russian triad. Over the past 8 years, their number has almost doubled due to the introduction of the new Topol-M and Yars systems into service.
However, this was done, so to speak, not from a good life. Because even today 60 percent of the warheads of the ground triad are carried by super-powerful liquid-propellant missiles such as Satan and Stiletto. They were put on alert back in the 80s of the last century and have long worked out the warranty period. There is nothing to replace them with, since these rocket monsters were manufactured at the Yuzhny Machine-Building Plant named after AM Makarov ”in Dnepropetrovsk, which after the collapse of the USSR stopped their production. But unlike Nikolaev, Yuzhmash did not stop work and is currently producing missile and other products. Not for Russia, however.
By the way, one of the most powerful Russian military groups deployed today in the Taganrog region has a clear operational direction to Donetsk and Dnepropetrovsk. The distance to them is 90 and 270 km, respectively, which will take a motorized rifle subunit from three to eight hours of march. Tempting for the Kremlin!
As we can see, over the past decade, a radical reform of the Russian armed forces has been accomplished. She was accompanied by significant rearmament, re-equipment and even the transition to new types of uniforms, primarily field uniforms. Of particular note is the dramatic increase in the pay of officers, contract soldiers and even conscripts. The size of salaries for military ranks has tripled, and for military positions - three and a half times. Each lieutenant, even with the smallest amount of allowances, began to receive more than 50 thousand rubles a month.
Naturally, such a major reform of the Russian armed forces could not have happened without a significant increase in military spending. But what happened to the military budget in fact is striking. According to SIPRI, Russia's military spending in 2003 was $ 13 billion. However, over the next 10 years, these costs have grown extremely. And in 2008 - 68 billion, in 2011 - 78 billion, in 2013 - 91 billion. And at the current time, their bar should rise to 100 billion.
Thus, in terms of military spending, Russia has firmly established itself in third place - after China and the United States. For comparison: this year military spending in India will amount to 48 billion, Germany - 49 billion, Japan - 59 billion. But among all these countries, Russia took first place in terms of the share of military spending with GDP - 4,4 percent!
What can I say! Military expenditures of this level are quite real in the event of war or its inevitability. But, apparently, Russia is not threatened by military aggression. So ...