As a professor from Minsk tried in vain to convince the authorities to save people after the Chernobyl accident

“The normal [radiation level] is 10-15 [micro-roentgens per hour], which is what it was. I got into the car, drove in, took the equipment and drove to the Chernobyl zone. <…> It was around seven or eight in the evening that I drove there. I crossed Bobruisk, beyond Bobruisk somewhere at 25 kilometers at about 5 thousand microroentgens per hour, I crossed such a small field - maybe two kilometers. Then it fell again. I arrived, turned to Khoiniki, in Khoiniki it was somewhere at the level of 15-18 thousand microroentgens. I went to Bragin, in the Bragin area there were about 30-35 [thousand microroentgens], then I returned, passed through Narovlya, in Narovlya there were probably also about 25-30 thousand [microroentgens].”

Photo: shot from the official trailer for the Chernobyl mini-series,
YouTube / HBO

The next morning, April 29 1986, Vasily Nesterenko, director of the Institute of Nuclear Energy of the Academy of Sciences of the Byelorussian SSR, came to the Minsk Central Committee to talk about the situation caused by the explosion of the reactor at the Chernobyl nuclear power plant. He was accepted only at half past five in the evening.

Having learned about the accident, Vasily Nesterenko knocked on all doors, seeking meetings with the highest party leaders so that they would “give the go-ahead” to save people. But he was ignored and later removed from his post. The scientist lost his career and suffered severe health problems.

This article is excerpts from an interview with Vasily Borisovich Nesterenko, which was recorded by writer Svetlana Alexievich for her book “Chernobyl Prayer”. This conversation has not been published anywhere before.

“If they had asked harshly then, Chernobyl would not have happened”

- For the first time I learned about this terrible accident when I was on a business trip in Moscow, 28 numbers. Although the accident, as you remember, happened at night from Friday to Saturday, on Sunday I quietly flew to Moscow. That is, no information was given. True, I noticed that I always have a dosimeter with me, that [something is happening] something unusual. But I decided that it was a faulty dosimeter: when the plane went up, I noticed somewhere at a height that it was showing too much. But I decided that the device was faulty, and flew away. It was a sunday.

On the morning [of Monday, April 28], I came to the Kremlin on institute business. I went into the department that deals with nuclear power plants and said: “I have a lot of questions, let’s solve them” - “No time for you, the Chernobyl reactor is burning.” I say: “Okay, on Monday morning - and such stupid jokes.” He says: “It’s no joke, the reactor is on fire.”

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I have been to this reactor many times, been to the Leningrad nuclear power plant, and to Smolensk. That is, we have several such stations. There was also at Ignalinskaya - this is the same type of reactor. This heavy reactor is the only reactor in the world that does not have a safety cap, its power is one thousand tons of graphite. By the way, graphite is needed there as a moderator. Either water should be. And if it caught fire, then this is a terrible thing.

A similar accident was in the 1975-1976 year at the Leningrad nuclear power plant: then it crashed somewhere around the 30 channels. A similar effect was at the Chernobyl station at the level of 1982-1983 of the year, when with one channel such trouble happened.

Then I was a member of the interdepartmental Union Council on Nuclear Energy, and all these cases were dealt with, naturally. I know how stringently the Minister of Medium Engineering Slavsky made demands. But these stations, unfortunately, were in the Ministry of Energy. And then the defense of honor and uniform began: “Why are you offending our people” - and everything went downhill. I think that if they had asked harshly then, Chernobyl would not have happened.

Photo: Chernobyl Union

April 28, 1986. “Two or three drops of iodine”

- Unfortunately, I find out that an accident has happened. You know that our villages are in 7-10 kilometers from the station. If it burns, then there is so much graphite that it will stop burning for more than a month. I, of course, immediately call the institute: enter the emergency instructions.

This mechanism is well developed. There are a number of measures: it is necessary to close the vents, turn off the ventilation.

We have such a rule that if such a disaster occurred at the reactor, it means there will be a release of radioactive iodine. It is necessary, the first - to carry out protection, iodine prophylaxis. This means that people should [drink it]. If they are professionals, then they have two or three tablets of potassium iodate in overalls. And if there is no home, then you just need to take a glass of milk, water - and drop it: for children, one or one and a half droplets, for you - two or three droplets. And then it gets into the thyroid gland. And if a radioactive cloud comes, there is already a stable iodine there: it will be very intensively excreted from the body - and the radioactive will deduce.

I found out about [the accident] at about half past nine. At about 10:15, maybe around ten, I called the institute. While connected... If you just start telling that this nuclear power plant is on fire, the connection is immediately broken, so you already speak with interjections. I say: “Don’t look here, it’s not your fault, it’s with our southern neighbors. Take protective measures."

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They say: “We have detected activity, our indoor [radiation level] is lower than outside.”

I say: “Take protective measures: this, that, that. And notify people, schools, kindergartens.” I asked them to call home.

After that, I dialed the phone number of the President of the Academy of Sciences [BSSR], I said: “Nikolai Alexandrovich, such a disaster has happened, what should be done?” I repeated it to him briefly. He says: “You know, I probably won’t be able to convince the managers, call Slyunkov directly.” (to the first secretary of the Central Committee - NV).

I contacted the assistant once or twice - they didn’t connect me, but the third time I finally got through. I begin to tell you that such an accident occurred. “Yes, there was a fire there, but everything was put out there already. Why are you panicking? I say: “Nikolai Nikitich, there is so much graphite there that it will burn, if it is not extinguished, for dozens of days.” - “Okay, fly in, come back tomorrow, we’ll sort it out.” And hung up. Well, naturally, I already left my business there, quickly caught the next plane to Sheremetyevo and flew here [to Minsk].

The normal [radiation level] is 10-15 x-ray roentgen per hour, that was. I [got] in the car, I stopped and took the equipment and went to the Chernobyl zone. I need to get new information. I went at night, somewhere around seven or eight in the evening I drove off there. I crossed Bobruisk, behind Bobruisk somewhere on the 25 kilometer about 5 thousands of micro-rots per hour, I slipped through such a field, a small one - maybe two kilometers. Then it fell again. I drove, turned to Khoiniki, in Khoiniki somewhere was at the level of 15-18 thousands of micro-roentgens. I went to Bragin, in the area of ​​Bragin somewhere 30-35 [thousands of microroentgen] was, then came back, skidded Narovlya, in Narovlya it was somewhere, probably, also about 25-30 thousands [micro X-ray].

April 29, 1986. "Don't cause panic"

- I got into the Central Committee, came to the reception, they say that he is busy, he cannot accept Slyunkov. I ran to Kuzmin (Secretary of the Communist Party of the BSSR - NV): I went once, the second, I see - no.

I went to the institute, I was returning in the afternoon. They traded pies, minced meat in the city - all this in the open. There was a lot of radioactive dirt.

I was received only at half past five in the evening. I went to Slyunkov, when I started telling him, he suddenly told me: “I have different information.” Dials the phone in front of me, calls Kovalev (Chairman of the Council of Ministers - НВ) and says: “Take Nesterenko, some other information than you and I were told.”

I came, went into Kovalev’s office and told him what needed to be done. I say: “This is what our service has planned. In such cases, it is necessary to carry out iodine prophylaxis, in such cases, participation (especially of children) in demonstrations is limited, in such cases, the city is supposed to be washed, people are advised not to sunbathe, swim, or work in garden plots, because there will be burns, cesium flies - there will be cesium burns."

Vasily Nesterenko said that 700 kilogram of iodine solution was prepared in the city. It could be added to drinking water, milk, and automatically protect all people. But in order to introduce such protective measures, the decision had to be taken by the Chairman of the Council of Ministers.

At that moment, in addition to the Chairman of the Council of Ministers, there were the Minister of Health, the chief sanitary officer of the city, the mayor of Minsk, and the chief-general of the headquarters of civil defense.

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- Some cards were laid out, arrows drawn. When I told you, this general gave cues. And I realized that he didn’t have a very good grade, what was the situation there, that either he doesn’t have information, or he cannot find his way around this information.

Health Minister Savchenko at this time called Academician Leonid Ilyin, the director of the Institute of Biophysics, who from the first days when the Soviet Union began to make atomic weapons, observed everyone who dealt with uranium and other radioactive material.

Nesterenko says that Ilyin allegedly asked what the radiation background is now in Minsk. Savchenko answered him: “About 300-400 microroentgen,” and then turned to Nesterenko: “The medical academic said that there is no need to do everything that you suggest.”

“And then Kovalev says to me: “You remove your dosimetrists from the city, let them not sow panic. And don't panic yourself. We'll sort it out, and you take command at Sosny. (the village in which the Institute of Nuclear Energy - NV) is located. We have such a conversation ended.

30 April 1986 of the year. First note

Фото: Depositphotos

“I see, since this is the case, I came to the institute, immediately sat down, wrote a memo and in the morning said to the head of the first department: “Take the note and hand it over to Slyunkov.” This is how my first letter appeared on April 30, 1986, where everything I told you - measures and iodine prophylaxis - all this was proposed. I then asked what the resolution was. But there was nothing beyond “washing the cities.”

To all of Nesterenko’s proposals to carry out iodine prophylaxis and speak to the population, he was answered: “Do you want there to be panic?” He told his employees about all the necessary measures.

“As soon as I arrived, they gathered the staff of the institute, they said: “Warn your acquaintances, friends, everyone: do not sunbathe, do not swim, do not go into the forest if possible, wipe down daily, do not open the windows, do not skip children.” There are measures that help a lot.

I hoped that they would either give me the opportunity to speak on television, or that someone would inform people. Because it’s no secret that every three hours or even more often the Polish radio broadcast: “In such and such a region, do not consume milk, in such and such a region, do not take berries.” People were oriented there. We didn't have any of this.

On April 30, the director from the Institute of Nuclear Research in Poland called me and said: “What government decisions do you have? What do we have to do?" I say: “I advise you to do this, that.” “I understand your advice, but what about the government’s decisions?” But I’m avoiding the question - because there are none.

6-7 May 1986 of the year. Second note

- Everything passed - [May Day demonstration], they played football in Bragin, and there was a bicycle race in Kiev. Bugs made a lot. A lot of children suffered because they are more susceptible to radiation. We were especially worried about iodine, of course, because iodine has a half-life of about eight days.

The reactor burned somewhere 10 days, and all these days people had to be protected. Therefore, we wanted to bring information. But you see, it was not possible to bring it, although a note was sent to the government.

On May 3, by the decision of the government, the Nesterenko Institute was instructed to conduct radiation reconnaissance and give an assessment. A group of specialists with mobile laboratories arrived in Khoiniki and in Bragin in the Gomel region of Belarus and selected samples: milk, eggs - a large set of products. We checked the thyroid glands in children. Nesterenko received a memorandum.

- I see that the situation is even more serious than I expected. Then I take their certificate with my note, I send it to the Ministry of Health, to the Council of Ministers, to the Central Committee, to the Ministry of Agriculture and Food, Civil Defense - to everyone.

This is 6 th [May]. No reaction. Then on the 7 number, I submit the note again to Slyunkov. She's right before my eyes.

I say that our team of experts conducted such and such analysis. We see that the level of pollution is high, it is a hundred or more times higher than acceptable, so people can get a hazardous area of ​​exposure. We felt that we need to expand the zone of resettlement. This is usually 30 kilometers, but you need another 50-70 kilometers - in order to remove people from the danger zone. Because what they measured in the Bragin area, Khoinikov are dangerous conditions for people.

Second: we proposed to create a commission, determine the specialists, what level of contamination of products - what can be eaten, what cannot.

The reaction was very weak. Our specialists continued to test, we were transported food - before the institute there were just dozens, and even hundreds of cars, brought everything for control. But, of course, everything was very dirty. Excess and milk, and everything else.

Фото: Depositphotos

First relocation

- I had to write these letters, because our people are so arranged: when you tell him, there are no reactions, and when you wrote a letter, you need to impose a resolution on the documents, something needs to be done. Still, I think that if I did not write this letter, it would be the opinion that everything happened in Belarus, because the scientists did not offer anything.

But, unfortunately, there is the second formulation: that there is no prophet in his Fatherland. We listened with pleasure to the Muscovites, because they were reassuring, but they really, I think, didn’t imagine the trouble at the beginning. If we were to remove people to 100 kilometers, we would have fewer problems than now.

Later [the head physician] of the Minsk City Oncologic Dispensary published information: lung cancer is 5,5 times higher than that of Minsk residents, 6,1 times more digestive tract cancer and 33,6 times higher than thyroid cancer. It is clear why. Thyroid cancer - because then they did not give iodine, the digestive tract - because all these years (they were resettled only in 1992-1993 to Minsk), they ate dirty foods on radionuclides. And finally, the lungs - because at first they were not protected from dust, which had hot particles.

Then a group of scientists had already gathered, we wrote a general note — it was sent to the presidium of the academy and to the government. It was also still in the month of May. But the answer was no reaction.

At the end of May, we constructed a map of isotope pollution of the Gomel region with cesium-137. But it was clear that a hundred villages still had to be resettled. Such a map was made to the government, was sent, of course, to the Gomel regional executive committee and so on. And somewhere in the beginning of June there was such a resettlement - not all the villages that we proposed, but still took place.

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