Despite the huge losses in the war with Ukraine, Russia will not run out of soldiers anytime soon, and here's why - ForumDaily
The article has been automatically translated into English by Google Translate from Russian and has not been edited.
Переклад цього матеріалу українською мовою з російської було автоматично здійснено сервісом Google Translate, без подальшого редагування тексту.
Bu məqalə Google Translate servisi vasitəsi ilə avtomatik olaraq rus dilindən azərbaycan dilinə tərcümə olunmuşdur. Bundan sonra mətn redaktə edilməmişdir.

Despite the huge losses in the war with Ukraine, Russia will not run out of soldiers anytime soon, and here's why

Russia launched its spring offensive with a large-scale attack on the "belt of fortresses"—heavily fortified cities in eastern Ukraine. The aggressor is simultaneously attacking energy infrastructure and civilian targets in Ukraine with drones and missiles, and it has plenty of soldiers. This explains why. The Conversation.

Ukraine's technological and tactical superiority allows it to incapacitate more Russian troops monthly than Russia can recruit. However, statements by Ukrainian Commander-in-Chief Oleksandr Syrskyi about the Kremlin's plans to recruit over 400,000 new troops by 2026 indicate an intention to continue the strategy of "meat assaults"—attempting to pressure Ukrainian positions with numerical superiority while simultaneously undermining the population's morale with attacks on energy infrastructure.

Naturally, such a strategy entails high casualties on the Russian side. This has led some Western observers to speculate that Vladimir Putin may be forced to negotiate, as the army lacks the manpower to continue fighting at this rate.

On the subject: The war in Iran is beneficial to Russia: its revenue from oil exports now amounts to $230 million per day.

The idea that Russia will face difficulties in recruiting the required number of military personnel is largely due to the experience of past wars.

During the Soviet-Afghan War of the 1980s and the First Chechen War of the 1990s, organizations of military mothers drew attention to the conditions of their sons' service. Poor living conditions, hazing, and corruption, as well as the state's failure to provide adequate support and recognition to veterans and the families of the fallen, undermined the army's reputation. This led to a deterioration in relations between society and the military, creating serious problems with recruitment.

This motif remains a common theme in Western accounts of the war. Much attention is paid to draft evasion, low morale and discipline at the front, and the mistreatment of veterans. The recruitment of convicts and the participation of troops from allied countries, such as North Korea and Serbia, in combat are also discussed.

Efforts to present military service as "real work" for "real men" were perceived as a sign of desperation. Yevgeny Prigozhin's attempted mutiny in 2023 became a more visible and resonant example of the potential failure of the mobilization system.

However, this war differs from the conflicts in Chechnya and Afghanistan. Since the 2000s, Russia has taken targeted steps to restructure the relationship between the army, the state, and society to avoid a repeat of previous experiences.

Both the Afghan and first Chechen wars were accompanied by the destruction of the distinctive social contract between the state and the army. This involved mutual obligations: the state provides service members with decent pay, housing, medical care, family support, and a certain social status, and in exchange, they perform military service.

After Afghanistan and Chechnya, this system effectively collapsed. A rift emerged between the army and the state, manifesting itself in the social and political marginalization of service members, as well as discontent and disillusionment within the military's highest echelons. In response, Russia implemented a series of reforms. In 2006, a public council, chaired by director Nikita Mikhalkov and overseen by the Ministry of Defense, was created. Its mission was to change this state of affairs.

In 2008, the Russian Armed Forces Development Strategy was adopted. It provided for significant financial benefits for the military, including housing, pensions, salary increases, and social guarantees. The departmental newspaper Krasnaya Zvezda wrote that, as a result of the reforms, "contract soldiers are becoming the country's middle class."

These measures were accompanied by efforts to strengthen military patriotism, which would more accurately be called "victory madness." Public initiatives such as the "Immortal Regiment" help maintain the military tradition associated with World War II, which in Russia is called the "Great Patriotic War." In Russia, the beginning of the war is still considered to be June 1941, not September 1939. This is unsurprising – on August 23, 1939, a week before the Nazi invasion of Poland, the USSR signed the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact with Germany. So, for a time, when the war in Europe had already begun, Stalin and Hitler were friends and allies.

Of course, such material and symbolic incentives don't appeal to everyone. During the war, the authorities tightened regulations and introduced severe penalties for draft evasion and the departure of men of military age.

At the same time, many Russians continue to live in the difficult economic conditions that emerged after the collapse of the USSR. Living conditions in Moscow and St. Petersburg differ greatly from those in rural Russia. There are still regions where residents heat their homes with wood and use public toilets to relieve themselves. In these regions, the military remains virtually the only available social mobility. Additional benefits for military personnel have exacerbated this situation.

This doesn't mean there aren't problems. Questions remain about the conditions of service, the level of social protection for service members and their families, and the legitimacy of the war in Ukraine. Lucia Caballero, the author of the article, may have "questions about the legitimacy of the war in Ukraine," but in reality, there are no questions—it is a terrorist, inhumane war waged by a "gas station country," as the late Senator John McCain aptly put it, against Ukraine and the entire civilized world. Relations between the state and society, especially with men, remain tense. Attempts are either made to smooth over or conceal these contradictions. Desertion also remains a serious problem.

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Nevertheless, high salaries and bonuses for signing contracts continue to attract new recruits eager to profit from the war. Therefore, the assumption that relations between the military and society will soon deteriorate, forcing Russia to negotiate, is questionable. Given that the current conflict in the Middle East is supporting the Russian economy, Western countries may need to focus on how to assist Ukraine on the battlefield.

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